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Abstract. Moral reasoning traditionally distinguishes two types of evil: moral (ME) and natural (NE). The
standard view is that ME is the product of human agency and so includes phenomena such as war, torture and
psychological cruelty; that NE is the product of nonhuman agency, and so includes natural disasters such as
earthquakes, floods, disease and famine; and finally, that more complex cases are appropriately analysed as
a combination of ME and NE. Recently, as a result of developments in autonomous agents in cyberspace, a
new class of interesting and important examples of hybrid evil has come to light. In this paper, it is called
artificial evil (AE) and a case is made for considering it to complement ME and NE to produce a more ad-
equate taxonomy. By isolating the features that have led to the appearance of AE, cyberspace is characterised
as a self-contained environment that forms the essential component in any foundation of the emerging field of
Computer Ethics (CE). It is argued that this goes some way towards providing a methodological explanation
of why cyberspace is central to so many of CE’s concerns; and it is shown how notions of good and evil can
be formulated in cyberspace. Of considerable interest is how the propensity for an agent’s action to be morally
good or evil can be determined even in the absence of biologically sentient participants and thus allows artificial
agents not only to perpetrate evil (and for that matter good) but conversely to ‘receive’ or ‘suffer from’ it. The
thesis defended is that the notion of entropy structure, which encapsulates human value judgement concern-
ing cyberspace in a formal mathematical definition, is sufficient to achieve this purpose and, moreover, that
the concept of AE can be determined formally, by mathematical methods. A consequence of this approach is
that the debate on whether CE should be considered unique, and hence developed as a Macroethics, may be
viewed, constructively, in an alternative manner. The case is made that whilst CE issues are not uncontrover-
sially unique, they are sufficiently novel to render inadequate the approach of standard Macroethics such as
Utilitarianism and Deontologism and hence to prompt the search for a robust ethical theory that can deal with
them successfully. The name Information Ethics (IE) is proposed for that theory. It is argued that the uniqueness
of IE is justified by its being non-biologically biased and patient-oriented: IE is an Environmental Macroethics
based on the concept of data entity rather than life. It follows that the novelty of CE issues such as AE can be
appreciated properly because IE provides a new perspective (though not vice versa). In light of the discussion
provided in this paper, it is concluded that Computer Ethics is worthy of independent study because it requires
its own application-specific knowledge and is capable of supporting a methodological foundation, Information
Ethics.
Key words: agent, artificial agent, artificial evil, cyberspace, entropy, environmentalism, evil, information ethics,
Kekes, moral evil, natural evil, nonsubstantialism, patient, theodicean problem, uniqueness debate
Abbreviations: a – agent; AAA – artificial and autonomous agent; AE – artificial evil; AHA – artificial and
heteronomous agent; CE – computer ethics; IE – information ethics; ICT – information and communication
technology; M – message; ME – moral evil; NAA – natural and autonomous agent; NE – natural evil; NHA –
natural and heteronomous agent; OOA – object-oriented analysis; p – patient
Introduction: The nature of evil
Evil is the most comprehensive expression of ethical
disapproval. As synonymous for extreme forms of
moral wrong and the reverse of moral good, it is a
key concept in any axiology. Of the many conceptual
clarifications available in the literature, three need to
be recalled here to provide the essential background of
the paper (see 1–3 below).1
1 The model follows but does not pressupose knowl-
edge of L. Floridi. Does Information have a Moral Worth
in Itself?. Computer Ethics: Philosophical Enquiry (CEPE
’98). London School of Economics and Political Science,
56 LUCIANO FLORIDI AND J.W. SANDERS
Any action, whether morally loaded or not, has
the logical structure of a variably interactive process,
which relates a set of one or more sources (depending
on whether we are working within a multiagent
context), the agent a, which initiates the process, with
a set of (one or more) destinations, the patient p,
which reacts to the process.2 To clarify the nature of
a and p it is useful to borrow the concept of ‘object’
from the object-oriented analysis paradigm (OOA).3
The agent and the patient are discrete, self-contained,
encapsulated4 packages containing:
• the appropriate data structures, which constitute
the nature of the entity in question (state of the
object, its unique identity, and attributes)
• a collection of operations, functions or proce-
dures (methods5), which are activated (invoked)
by various interactions or stimuli, namely
messages (in this essay ‘actions’ is used with this
technical meaning) received from other objects
(message passing) or changes within itself, and
correspondingly define (implement) how the
object behaves or reacts to them.
In Leibnizian and more metaphysical terms, an object
is a sufficiently permanent (a continuant) monad, a
description of the ultimate primal component of all
beings. The moral action itself can be constructed as
an information process, i.e. a series of messages (M),
initiated by an agent a, that brings about a transforma-
tion of states directly affecting a patient p, which may
interactively respond to M with changes and/or other
London, 14–15 December, 1998, http://www.wolfson.ox.ac.uk/
˜floridi/cepe.htm.
2 The terms ‘agent’ and ‘patient’ are standard in Ethics and
therefore will be maintained in this paper, however, it is essen-
tial to stress the interactive nature of the process and hence the
fact that the patient is hardly ever a passive receiver of an action.
A better way to qualify the patient in connection with the agent
would be to refer to it as the ‘reagent’.
3 The article follows the standard terminology and the
conceptual apparatus provided in J. Rumbaugh et al., Object-
Oriented Modeling and Design. Prentice Hall, Englewood
Cliffs, NJ, 1991.
4 Encapsulation or information hiding is the technique
of keeping together data structures and the methods (class-
implemented operations), which act on them in such a way that
the package’s internal structure can be accessed only by means
of the approved package routines. External aspects of an object,
which are accessible to other objects, are thus separated from
the internal implementation details of the object itself, which
remain hidden from other objects.
5 A method is a particular implementation of an operation,
i.e. an action or transformation that an object performs or is
subject to by a certain class. An operation may be implemented
by more than one method.
messages, depending on how M is interpreted by p’s
methods, that is ∃a∃pM(a, p).
When discussing the nature of evil, the following
two clarifications are usually accepted as standard:
1) ‘evil’ is a second order predicate that qualifies
primarily M.
Only actions are primarily evil.6 Sources of evil
(agents and their intentional states) are identified as
evil in a derivative and often unclear sense: inten-
tional states are wicked (evil) if they (can) lead to
evil actions, and agents are overall wicked (evil)
if the preponderance of their intentional states or
actions is evil. The domain of intentional states or
actions, however, is probably infinite, so the concept of
‘preponderance’ is based either on a limit in time and
scope (a is wicked/evil between time t1 and time tn and
as far as intentional states or actions y are concerned),
or on a inductive/probabilistic projection (a is such
that a’s future intentional states or actions are more
likely to be evil than good). Obvious difficulties in both
approaches reinforce the view that an agent is evil only
derivatively;
2) the interpretation of a ranges over the domain of
all agents, both human and nonhuman.
Evil actions are the result of human or nonhuman
agency (e.g. natural disasters).7 The former is known
as moral evil (ME) and it implies autonomy and
responsibility, and hence a sufficient degree of infor-
mation, freedom and intentionality. The latter is known
as natural evil (NE). It is usually defined negatively,
as any evil that arises independently of human inter-
vention, in terms of prevention, defusing, or control.
A third clarification, although rather common, is less
uncontroversial:
3) the positive sense in which an action is evil (a’s
intentional harming) is parasitic on the privative
sense in which its effect is evil (decrease in p’s
welfare).
6 See for example S.L. Anderson. Evil. Journal of Value
Inquiry, 24(1): 43–53, 1990; J. Hampton. The Nature of Immor-
ality. Social Philosophy and Policy, 7(1): 22–44, 1989; J.
Kekes. Understanding Evil. American Philosophical Quarterly,
25: 13–24, 1988; J. Kekes. Facing Evil. Princeton University,
Princeton, NJ, 1990; J. Kekes. The Reflexivity of Evil. Social
Philosophy and Policy, 15(1): 216–232, 1998a; J. Kekes. Evil.
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge, London,
1998b.
7 Anderson (1990) argues that to be evil an action must be
done consciously, voluntarily and wilfully, and the agent must
cause some harm, or allow some harm to be done, to at least
one other person. This definition seems too demanding, as it
captures only the meaning of “moral evil”. In this paper, we
argue for a more minimalist view.
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Contrary to ‘responsibility’ – an agent-oriented con-
cept that works as a robust theoretical ‘attractor’, in
the sense that standard Macroethics (e.g. Consequen-
tialism or Deontologism) tend to concentrate on it for
the purpose of moral evaluations of the agent – ‘evil’ is
a perspicuously patient-oriented concept. Actions are
ontologically dependent on agents for their implemen-
tation (evil as cause), but are evaluated as evil only in
view of the degree of severe and unnecessary harm that
they may cause to their patients (evil as effect). Hence,
whether an action is evil can be decided only on the
basis of a clear understanding of the nature and future
development of the interacting patient.
Since an action is evil if and only if it harms
or tends to harm its patient, evil, understood as the
harmful effect that could be suffered by the interacting
patient, is properly analysed only in terms of possible
corruption, decrease, deprivation or limitation of p’s
welfare, where the latter can be defined in terms of
the object’s appropriate data structures and methods.
This is the classic, ‘privative’ sense in which evil is
parasitic on the good and does not exist independently
of the latter (evil as privationem boni).8 In view of
this further qualification, and in order to avoid any
terminological bias, it is better to avoid using the term
‘harm’ – a zoocentric, not even biocentric word, which
implicitly leads to the interpretation of p as a sentient
being with a nervous system9 – in favour of ‘damage’,
an ontocentric, more neutral term, with ‘annihilation’
as the level of most severe damage.
According to the OOA approach endorsed in this
paper, messages are processes that affect objects either
positively or negatively. Positive messages respect or
enhance p’s welfare; negative messages do not respect
or damage p’s welfare. Evil actions are a subclass of
negative messages, those that do not merely fail to
respect p but (can) damage it.10 The following defi-
8 R. Gaita. Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception.
Macmillan, London 1991, for example, accepts this “Platonist
view” (p. 191): “evil can be understood only in the light of the
goodness. I shall yield to the temptation to express Platonically
and say that evil can be understood only in the light of ‘the
Good’.” However, he does not attempt to clarify, ultimately,
how evil should be defined, but argues that (p. 192) “There
cannot be an independent metaphysical inquiry into the ‘reality’
of good and evil which would underwrite or undermine the most
serious of our ways of speaking. [. . .] It would be better, at least
in ethics, to banish the word ‘ontology’ ”.
9 R. Taylor. Good and Evil – A New Direction. Macmillan,
London, 1970 (p. 126): “Thus, the things that nourish and give
warmth and enhance life are deemed good, and those that frus-
trate and threaten are deemed bad. [. . .] [p. 129] [good is] that
which satisfies or fulfils, [evil is] that which frustrates felt needs
and goals” (italics added).
10 For an axiological analysis see Floridi (1998).
nition attempts to capture the clarifications introduced
so far:
(E) Evil action = one or more negative messages,
initiated by a, that brings about a transformation
of states that (can) damage p’s welfare severely
and unnecessarily; or more briefly, any patient-
unfriendly message.
(E) excludes both victimless and anonymous evil: an
action is (potentially) evil only if there is (could be) a
damaged patient, and there is no evil action without a
damaging source, even if, in a multiagent and distrib-
uted context, this may be sufficiently vague or complex
to escape clear identification (however, we shall argue
below that this does not imply that evil cannot be
gratuitous). In fact, because standard Macroethics
tend to prioritise agent-centred analyses, they usually
concentrate on evil actions a parte agentis, by presup-
posing the presence of an agent and qualifying the
agent’s actions as evil, at least hypothetically or coun-
terfactually. On the basis of these clarifications, it is
now possible to develop five main theses:
1) IE (Information Ethics) can defend a deflationary
approach to the existence of evil
2) ICT (information and communication technology)
modifies the interpretation of some evils, trans-
forming them from natural into moral
3) ICT extends the class of agents, generating a new
form of artificial evil (AE)
4) ICT extends the class of patients, promoting a new
understanding of evil as introduction or increase of
entropy
5) (1)–(4) contribute to clarify the uniqueness debate
in computer ethics.
Nonsubstantialism: A deflationary approach to the
existence of evil
The classic distinction ME vs. NE is sufficiently
intuitive but may also be misleading. Human beings
may act as Natural Agents, e.g. unaware and healthy
carriers of a disease, and natural evil may be the
mere means of moral evil, e.g. through morally blame-
worthy negligence. But above all, the terminology may
be misleading because it is the result of the application
of first (‘moral’, ‘natural’) to a second order (‘evil’)
predicate, which paves the way to a questionable hypo-
stasization of evil and what Schmitz has aptly called an
“entitative conception of evil”.11 Evil is reified as if it
were a ‘token’ transmitted by M from a to p, an over-
simplified ‘communication’ model that is implausible,
11 K.L. Schmitz. Entitative and Systemic Aspects of Evil.
Dialectics and Humanism, 5: 149–161, 1978.
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since a’s messages can generate negative states only by
interacting with p’s methods, and do not seem either to
be evil independently of them, or to bear and transfer
some pre-packaged, perceivable evil by themselves.
To avoid the hypostasization of evil, a nonsubstan-
tialist position (i) must defend a deflationary inter-
pretation of evil’s existence without (ii) accepting the
equally implausible alternative represented by revi-
sionism, i.e. the negation of the existence of evil tout
court, which may rely, for example, on an epistemolo-
gical interpretation for its elimination (evil as appear-
ance). This can be achieved by (iii) accepting the
derivative and privative senses of evil (evil as absence
of good) to clarify that ‘there is no evil’ means that
(iv) only actions, and not objects in themselves, can
be qualified as primarily evil, and that (v) what type
of evil x is should not be decided on the basis of
the nature of the agent initiating x, since ME and
NE do not refer to some special classes of entities,
which would be intrinsically evil, nor to some special
classes of actions per se, but they are only short-
cuts to refer to a three-place relation between types
of agents, actions and patients’ welfare, hence to a
specific, context-determined interpretation of the triple
<a, M, p>.
The points made in (i)–(v) seem perfectly reason-
able. Unfortunately, especially in ancient philos-
ophy,12 they have often been overinterpreted as an
argument for the non-existence of evil. This is because
nonsubstantialism has been equated with revisionism
through an ontology of things, i.e. the assumption that
either x is a substance, something, or x does not exist.
But since evil is so widespread in the world, any argu-
ment that attempts to deny its existence is doomed
to be rejected as sophistic. So revisionism is hardly
defensible and, through the equation, the consequence
has been that the presence of evil in the world has often
been taken as definitive evidence against nonsubstan-
tialism as well and, even more generally, as a final
criticism of any theory based on (1)–(3) and (i)–(v).
It should be obvious, however, that this conclusion
is not inevitable: nonsubstantialism is deflationary but
not revisionist, and it is perfectly reasonable to defend
the former position by rejecting the implicit reliance
on a simple ontology of things. Actions-messages and
objects’ states, as defined in the OOA paradigm for
example, do not have a lower ontological status than
objects themselves. Evil exists not absolutely, per se,
but in terms of damaging actions and damaged objects.
The fact that its existence is parasitic does not mean
that it is fictitious. On the contrary, in an ontology
12 Especially in the Platonic tradition, see Plato, Proclus,
Plotin, Augustine, but also Aristotle and in modern times
Leibniz and Spinoza.
that treats interactions, methods (operations, functions
and procedures) and states on the same level as objects
and their attributes, evil could not be any more real.
Once an ontology of things is replaced by a more
adequate OOA ontology, it becomes possible to have
all the benefits of talking about evil without the onto-
logical costs of a substantialist hypostasization. This
is the approach defended by IE.13 The objection, a
deflationary approach does not seem to do justice to
the reality of evil (e.g. pain and suffering), can be
compared to the objection of quantum physics that it
does not seem to do justice to the reality of chairs and
tables.
The evolution of evil and the theodicean problem
Natural evil has been introduced as any evil that arises
through no human action, either positive or negative:
NE is whatever evil human beings do not initiate and
cannot prevent, defuse or control.14 Since the discus-
sion on the nature of evil has been largely monopolised
by the theodicean debate (whether it is possible to
reconcile the existence of God and the presence of
evil),15 contemporary Macroethics seem to have failed
13 See Floridi (1998).
14 It is probably useful to conceive different kinds of NE
as placed on a scale, from the not-humanly-initiated and not-
preventable earthquake (only the evil effects of it can be a
matter of human responsibility) to the not-humanly-initiated
but humanly preventable plague to the humanly initiated and
preventable mistake (human agents as natural causes).
15 Most discussions of the nature of evil, at least in Western
philosophy, have focused exclusively on the theoretical problem
of evil as it arises within the context of biblical religion, treating
the existence of evil as a classical objection to theism. A
clear example of this monopoly is provided by John Hick’s
article “The Problem of Evil”, in The Encyclopedia of Philos-
ophy, edited by P. Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 1967),
which concentrates solely upon the theodicean debate, ignoring
any other ethical issue connected with the existence of evil.
However, more recently things have changed, and in the Rout-
ledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, for example, we find two
separate entries, one on the theodicean problem of evil, and one
the axiological nature of evil (Kekes 1998b). Computer Ethics
can help to reinforce this “secular” trend and a clear distinc-
tion between axiological vs. theological analyses of evil. On
the theodicean problem, see M.M. Adams and R.M. Adams,
editors, The Problem of Evil. Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1990. On the axiological analysis of evil see I. Benn. Wicked-
ness. Ethics, 95(4): 795–810, 1985; Kekes (1988, 1990, 1998a,
1998b); R.D. Milo. Immorality. Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 1984; G.E. Moore. Principia Ethica, rev. edn.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1993, pp. 256–262.
M. Gelven. The Meanings of Evil. Philosophy Today, 27(3/4):
200–221, 1983 provides an analysis of the various ways in
which the word “evil” is used in English.
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to notice that this definition entails the possibility of a
diachronic transformation of what may count as NE
because of the increasing power of design, configu-
ration, prevision and control over reality offered by
science and technology (sci-tech), including ICT. If a
negative definition of NE, in terms of ¬ ME, is not
only inevitable but also adequate, the more powerful
a society becomes, in terms of its sci-tech, the more
its members are responsible for what is within their
power to influence. Past generations, when confronted
by natural disasters like famine or flood, had little
choice but to put up with their evil effects. Nowadays,
most of the ten plagues of Egypt would be considered
moral rather than natural evils because of human negli-
gence.16 A clear sign of how much the world has
changed is that people expect human solutions for
virtually any natural evil, even when this is well
beyond the scientific and technological capacities of
present times. Whenever a natural disaster occurs, the
first reaction has become to check whether anyone is
responsible for an action that might have initiated or
prevented its evil effects. Resignation is no longer an
obvious virtue.
The human-independent nature of NE and the
power of science and technology, especially ICT,
with its computational capacities to forecast events,
determine a peculiar phenomenon of constant erosion
of NE in favour of an expansion of ME. If anyone
were to die from smallpox in the future this would
certainly be a matter of ME, no longer NE. Witch-
craft in theory and sci-tech in practice share the
responsibility of transforming NE into ME and this
is why their masters look morally suspicious. It is
an erosion that is inevitable, insofar as science and
technology can constantly increase human power over
nature. It may also seem unidirectional: at first, it
may appear that the only transformation brought about
by the evolution of sci-tech is a simplification in
the nature of evil. Bunge, for example, analyses the
moral responsibility brought about by technological
advances, stressing how the “technologists”, i.e. the
technology-empowered persons, will be increasingly
16 It may be interesting to stress that in the Old Testament
the plagues have mainly an ontological value, as signs of total
control and power over reality, rather than ethical. Several
times the Pharaoh’s magicians are summoned to deal with the
extraordinary phenomena, but the point is always whether they
may be able to achieve the same effects ‘by their secret arts’
– hence showing that there is either no divine intervention or
equal divine support on the Egyptian side – not whether they
can undo or solve the difficulties caused by the specific plague.
They loose the ‘ontic game’ when ‘the magicians tried by their
secret arts to bring forth gnats, but they could not’.
responsible for their professional actions.17 However,
the introduction of the concept of artificial evil (AE)
provides a corrective to this view (see next section). If,
for the present purpose, it is simply assumed that, at
least in theory, all NE can become ME but not vice
versa, it is obvious that this provides an interesting
approach to the classic theodicean problem of evil.
The theist may need to explain only the presence of
ME despite the fact that God is omniscient, omnipo-
tent, and all-good, and it is known that a theodicy
based on the responsibility that comes with freedom
is more defensible,18 especially if connected with a
nonsubstantialist approach to the existence of evil. In
a utopian world, the occurrence of evil may be just
a matter of human misbehaviour. What matters here,
of course, is not to solve the theodicean puzzle, but
to realise how ICT is contributing to make humanity
increasingly accountable, morally speaking, for the
way the world is.
Artificial evil
More and more often, especially in advanced societies,
people are confronted by visible and salient evils that
are neither simply natural nor immediately moral:
an innocent dies because the ambulance was delayed
by the traffic; a computer-based monitor ‘reboots’
in the middle of surgery because its software is not
fully compatible with other programs also in use,
with the result that the patient is at increased risk
during the reboot period. The examples could easily
be multiplied. What kind of evils are these? ‘Bad
luck’ and ‘technical incident’ are simply admissions
of ignorance. Conceptually, they indicate the short-
comings of the ME vs. NE dichotomy. The problem
is that the latter was formulated at a time when the
primary concern was anthropocentric, human-agent-
oriented and the main issue addressed was that of
human and divine responsibility. Strictly speaking,
the difference between human and natural agents
is not that the former are not natural, but that
they are autonomous, i.e. they can regulate them-
selves. So, following the standard approach, the
correct taxonomy turns out to be a four-place scheme:
forms of agency are either natural or artificial (non-
natural) and either autonomous or heteronomous (non-
autonomous). Although this is not the context to
provide a detailed analysis of an agent, the following
definition is sufficiently adequate to clarify these four
basic forms of agency:
17 M. Bunge. Towards a Technoethics. The Monist, 60: 96–
107, 1977.
18 See A. Plantinga. God, Freedom, and Evil. Allen & Unwin;
William B. Eerdmans, London/Grand Rapids, MI, 1975.
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A) Agent = a system, situated within and a part of
an environment, which initiates a transformation,
produces an effect or exerts power on it over
time, as contrasted with a system that is (at least
initially) acted on or responds to it (patient).
A natural agent is an agent that has its ontological
basis in the normal constitution of reality and conforms
to its course, independently of human beings’ inter-
vention. Conversely, an artificial agent is an agent
that has its ontological basis in a human constructed
reality and depends, at least for its initial appearance,
on human beings’ intervention. An autonomous agent
is an agent that has some kind of control over its
states and actions, senses its environment, responds to
changes that occur in it and interacts with it, over time,
in pursuit of its own goals, without the direct inter-
vention of other agents. And a heteronomous agent is
simply an agent that is not autonomous. Given these




NAA = natural and autonomous agent, e.g. a person,
an animal, an angel, a god, an extraterrestrial.
NHA = natural and heteronomous agent, e.g. a flood,
an earthquake, a nuclear fission.
AAA = artificial and autonomous agent, e.g. a webbot,
an expert system, a software virus, a robot.
AHA = artificial and heteronomous agent, e.g. traffic,
inflation, pollution.
ME is any evil produced by a responsible NAA; NE is
any evil produced by NHA and by any NAA that may
not be held directly responsible for it; AE is any evil
produced by either AAA or AHA. The question now
is: is AE always reducible to (perhaps a combination
of) NE or ME?
It is clear that AE is not reducible to NE because
of the nature of the agent involved, whose existence
depends on human creative ingenuity. But this leads
precisely to the main objection against the presence
of AE, namely that any AE is really just ME under
a different name. We saw that Bunge may be read
as supporting this view. Human creators are morally
accountable for whatever evil may be caused by their
artificial agents, as mere means or intermediaries of
human activities (indirect responsibility). The objec-
tion of indirect responsibility is based on an analogy
with the theodicean problem and is partly justified. In
the same way as a divine creator can be blamed for NE,
so a human creator can be blamed for AE.
A first reply consists in remarking that even in a
theodicean context one still speaks of ‘natural’ not
of ‘divine’ evils, thus indicating the nature of the
agent, not of the morally responsible source. But this,
admittedly, would be a weak retort, for it misses the
important ethical point: if NE is ‘real’ then this causes
a problem precisely because it is reducible to ‘divine’
evil and, mutatis mutandis, this could apply to the
relation between AE and ME. AE could be just the
result of carrying on morally wrong actions by other
means.
A better reply consists in clarifying the differences
between the two cases. On the one hand, AE may be
caused by AHA whose behaviour depends immedi-
ately and directly on human behaviour. In this case,
the reduction AE = ME is reasonable. AHA are just an
extension of their human creators, like tools, because
the latter are both the ontological and the nomological
source of the formers’ behaviour. Human beings can
be taken to be directly accountable for the artifi-
cial evil involved, e.g. pollution. On the other hand,
AAA, whose behaviour is nomologically independent
of human intervention, may cause AE. In this case, the
interpretative model is not God vs. created universe,
but parents vs. children. Although it is conceivable that
the evil caused by a child may be partly blamed on
their parents, it is also true that, normally, the sins of
the sons will not be passed on to the fathers. Indirect
responsibility can only be forward, not backward, as it
were. Things are in fact even more complicated than
this. Recall that
i) evil refers primarily to actions, and
ii) an action is evil if it causes serious and morally
unjustified harm
iii) according to Kekes19 if an evil action is reflexive
this means that it should be taken to reflect
adversely on the agent whose action it is and this
agent would be held responsible for its action; but
then, it cannot be true that
iv) all evil actions, in the sense specified in (i)–(ii),
are reflexive, in the sense specified in (iii).
The negation of (iv) follows from the fact that there are
many autonomous agents that can perform evil actions
without being responsible for them. Kekes, however,
argues the opposite and maintains that (i)–(iv) are
consistent.20 He does so by relying on a questionable
interpretation of “autonomy” and on the denial of a
classic ethical principle:
v) “actions are autonomous if their agents (a) choose
to perform them, (b) their choices are unforced,
(c) they understand the significance of their
choices and actions, and (d) they have favourably
evaluated the actions in comparison with other
19 See Kekes (1998a).
20 See Kekes (1998a).
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actions available to them. [. . .] Actions of which
any one or more of (a), (b), (c), or (d) is not true
are nonautonomous.”21
However, it is clear that, following (v), many human
beings, no animal or no artificial agent could ever be
autonomous, so Kekes is forced to argue that
vi) in many cases, neither the evil actions nor the
vices from which they follow are autonomous.
It is nevertheless justified to hold the agents
who perform these actions morally responsible for
them; the widespread denial of this claim rests
on the principle “ought implies can”; the latter,
however, cannot be used to exempt agents from
moral responsibility for their nonautonomous
actions and vices.
In fact, (v) seems to provide more a definition of
freedom than a definition of autonomy, which is
usually taken to be synonymous for “self-regulating”
when it qualifies the nature of an agent. Rather than
maintaining (v) and hence being forced to abandon the
“ought-can” principle following (vi), it may be more
acceptable to invert the process. After all, the ought-
can principle may be worth salvaging, and the step
taken in (vi) obscures the fact that people could be
guilty of evil actions even if they are not responsible
for them. Evil can be unintentional and this is the
sense in which life can be tragic, Oedipus docet. If
one maintains the ought-can principle and rejects (v)
as being too strong, then (i)–(iv) needs to be modified,
and since in this paper we agree with Kekes on (i)–(iii),
(iv) must be rejected. Evil actions can be irreflexive
or gratuitous, i.e. they can be caused by sources that
cannot be held responsible for them. A correct defini-
tion of “autonomy”, hence the revision of clause (iv),
allows one to consider all agents, including animals
and artificial agents, indirectly or derivatively evil
whenever they are the regular source of evil actions,
despite their lack of understanding, intent and free
ability to choose to do evil, and hence moral respon-
sibility.22 Note that, given our deflationary account
of evil, this does not justify abusive treatment of
evil agents. Only evil actions are rightly considered
intrinsically worthless or even positively unworthy and
therefore rightly disrespectable in themselves.23 If all
this seems complicated, the reason is that we are trying
21 Kekes (1998a), p. 217.
22 R. Rosenfeld. an Animals Be Evil?: Kekes’ Character-
Morality, the Hard Reaction to Evil, and Animals. Between the
Species, 11(1–2): 33–38, 1995; B.A. Dixon. Response: Evil
and the Moral Agency of Animals. Between the Species, 11(1–
2): 38–40, 1995; R. Rosenfeld. Reply. Between the Species,
11(1–2): 40–41, 1995.
23 The point is fully developed in Floridi (1998).
to analyse a problem that is eminently patient-centred,
i.e. the existence of evil, by means of a vocabulary
and a cluster of concepts that are inherited from an
agent-oriented tradition.
Artificial ‘creatures’ can be compared to pets,
agents whose scope of action is very wide, which can
cause all imaginable evils, but which cannot be held
morally responsible for their behaviour, owing to their
insufficient degree of intentionality, intelligence and
freedom. It turns out that, like in a universe without
God, in cyberspace evil may be utterly gratuitous:
there may be evil actions without any causing agent
being morally blameable for them. Digital Artificial
Agents are becoming sufficiently autonomous to pre-
empt the possibility that their creators may be nomo-
logically in charge of, and hence morally accountable
for their misbehaviour. And we are still dealing with
a generation of agents fairly simple, predictable and
controllable. The phenomenon of potential artificial
evil will become even more obvious as self-produced
generations of AAA evolve. Of course there is no
ITheodicean problem because the creators, in this
case, are fallible, only partly knowledgeable, possibly
malevolent and may work at cross-purposes, so there is
no need to explain how the presence of humanity may
be compatible with the presence of AE. Unfortunately,
like Platonic demiurges, fallible creators much less
powerful than God, we may not be able to construct
truly intelligent AAA, but we can certainly endow
them with plenty of autonomy and interactivity, and
it is in this lack of balance that the risk lies. It is clear
that something similar to Asimov’s Laws of Robotics
will need to be enforced for the digital environment
(the infosphere) to be kept safe. Sci-tech transforms
natural into moral evil but at the same time creates a
new form of evil, AE. In a dystopian world like the
one envisaged in the film directed by Andy and Larry
Wachowski The Matrix (1999), there could be just AE
and ME.
Extending the class of patients of artificial evil
In the previous section we have made the case for an
Artificial Agent to be the source of an evil action. To
contrast that case with the standard one, in which evil
applies to the actions of Natural Agents, let us call that
position Weak Artificial Evil (WAE).24 Strong Artifi-
cial Evil (SAE) is the position that an Artificial Agent
can be the patient (or reagent, recall the interactive
nature of the action-relation between agent and patient)
24 Cf. weak AI, John R. Searle. Minds, Brains, and Programs.
The Behavioural and Brain Sciences, vol. 3. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1980, Cambridge.
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of Artificial Evil. In this section we revisit the previous
argument and make the case for SAE.
SAE has been prefigured by the deep ecology of
Environmental Ethics25 in which the state of inani-
mate objects is taken into account when considering
the consequences of an action (e.g. how is building a
certain freeway going to impinge on the rock face in its
path). However, in the form of SAE the concept can be
taken further, due largely to the characteristic proper-
ties of cyberspace, i.e. the (eco)system of information
acted on by digital agents. The information is stored
as bits, but encompasses vast tracts of data in the form
of databases, files, records and online archives. The
agents are programs and so include operating systems
and applications software. Cyberspace is spanned by
the Internet, which provides the vacuous but connected
space; it is populated by all that data and programs
and is lent geometrical presence by the web. It is to be
emphasised that it is not helpful, for present purposes
and despite its name, to conceive of cyberspace only
spatially: the rapid search and communications that
are part of the web ensure that only addresses matter.
Indeed, the features of importance to us here are:
a) spatiality: completeness of the network (any
site is available from any other: point-to-
point connectivity); homogeneity (standardised
addresses); robustness against failure (Cartesian
multiplicity of links);
b) democracy: nonhierarchical; not policed; free
where possible; user extensible;
c) real-time: fast synchronous access to sites and
fast asynchronous email communication; high
bandwidth;
d) digitised: standardised digital storage and
communications (both interpreted consistently
throughout cyberspace).
Features (a)–(d) seem to characterise interactions in
cyberspace. For example ecommerce exploits (a), (b),
(c); downloading free music exploits (b), (d).
The frontier of cyberspace is the human/machine
interface; thus we regard humans as lying outside
cyberspace. In his famous Test,26 Turing posited
a keyboard/screen interface to blanket human and
computer. Half a century later, that very interface has
become part of our everyday reality. Helped perhaps
by the ubiquitous television and the part it has played
in informing and entertaining us, we are coming to rely
on that interface for communication (email), informa-
25 M. Zimmerman et al., editors, Environmental Philos-
ophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology. Prentice Hall,
Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1993.
26 A.M. Turing. Computing Machinery and Intelligence.
Mind, 59(236): 433–460, 1950.
tion (sites), business (ecommerce) and entertainment
(computer games). The all-pervading nature of cyber-
space seems at present to depend partly on the extent to
which we accept its interface as integral to our reality;
indeed we have begun to accept the virtual as reality.
What matters is not so much moving bits instead of
atoms – this is an outdated, communication-based
interpretation of the information society that owes
too much to mass-media sociology – as the far more
radical fact that the very essence and fabric of reality
is changing. The information society is better seen as a
neo-manufacturing society in which raw materials and
energy have been superseded by the new digital gold.
Not just communication and transactions then, but the
creation, design and management of information are
the keys to its proper understanding.
Cyberspace supports a variety of agents: from
routine service software (like communications proto-
cols) through less routine applications packages (like
cybersitters, webbots) to applets downloadable from
remote web sites. The latter highlight a shift in
the burden of responsibility of software engineers.
Formerly, (and still, of course, in the bulk of situations
today) there was a contract between software engineer
and user: the software engineer was responsible for
the performance of the software, defensible if neces-
sary at law. That model suited the context in which
computers, or local-area networks, were isolated from
others, except by physical media (disks, CDROMs,
etc). In the new model, promoted by cyberspace, there
is no ‘point of sale’, since a program may be down-
loaded at one of a sequence of mouse clicks, with
no clear responsibility or even specification attending
its acquisition. So seamless is the interface that the
user may not even be aware that a program has been
downloaded and executed locally.
The autonomy (and hence seamlessness) of that
interaction is further reinforced by Artificial Agents
which employ randomisation in making decisions (the
giver of a coin can hardly be held responsible for
decisions made on the basis of tossing it, even if
the coin is sold as a binary-decision-making mech-
anism); and Artificial Agents which are able to adapt
their behaviour on the basis of experience (in only an
indirect sense were the programmers of Deep Blue
responsible for its win, since it ‘learnt’ by being
exposed to volumes of games;27 thus its programmers
were quite unable to explain, in any of the terms of
chess parlance, how Deep Blue played).28 Given the
27 D. King. Kasparov v. Deeper Blue. B T Batsford, Ltd,
London, 1997.
28 T.M. Mitchell. Machine Learning. McGraw Hill, 1997
provides the following examples of adaptive software: ‘data-
mining programs that learn to detect fraudulent credit-card
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presence of such agents, and the tendency towards
further autonomy, the only reasonable view seems to
be that misfortune resulting from such programs is evil
for which neither human nor nature is directly respon-
sible. Such a situation does not appear in the phys-
ical world inhabited by mechanical artifacts because
their physical presence renders such machines, and
their behaviour, traceable to their origins. Were they
autonomous and able to transform and adapt, in the
way programs can, such machines would provide an
analogous example of AE; but so far they seem to be
no more than instruments of science fiction.29
Cyberspace and its interface support actions that
may originate from humans (email from a colleague)
or Artificial Agents (messages from a word processor
or directives from a webbot). The claim is not that
current software has passed the Turing Test. It is
simply that, with the types of software mentioned
above, there is scope for evil that lies beyond the
responsibility of human beings or nature.
Our region of cyberspace is in general changed
as a result of the autonomous execution of Artifi-
cial Agents: decisions are delegated to routine proce-
dures, data are altered, settings changed and programs
subsequently behave differently. Artificial Patients in
cyberspace thus ‘respond’ or ‘react’, often interac-
tively, to actions. Some actions seem benign: the easter
eggs cuckoo-ed inside Macintosh and Palm software30
constitute such examples. It seems equally clear that
certain actions on Artificial Patients are evil: viruses
and the action of certain webbots, for example. But
the case for an Artificial Agent being the recipient
of evil (and in particular, Artificial Evil) depends
on our being able to make the case for determining
when the preponderance of consequences – as far as
the patient goes – are bad. For that, we rely on the
digital nature of cyberspace and employ the notion of
entropy.31
transactions, to information-filtering programs that learn users’
reading preferences, to autonomous vehicles that learn to drive
on public highways.’
29 For mechanisms that adapt to terrain see http://www.
parc.xerox.com/modrobots. For statistically adaptive recon-
figurable logic arrays, see http://jisp.cs.nyu.edu/RWC/rwcp/
activities/achievements/AD/nec/eng/home-e.html. In fiction
adaptive robots occur in the work of James P Hogan (e.g. ‘Two
faces of Tomorrow’ (1979) in which a semi-intelligent system
controls a production line as part of a space station and, under
pressure of attack, designs and produces different kinds of
robot) and the popular film Terminator 2 (in which the shape-
shifting cyborg, T-1000 is sent back from the future to kill John
Connor before he can grow up to lead the resistance).
30 D. Pogue. Palm Pilot: The Ultimate Guide, 2nd edn.
O’Reilly Press, 1999.
31 What follows summarises an argument begun in Floridi
First, we observe that an action in cyberspace is not
uncontroversially bad or good; some value judgement
is required to evaluate its moral worth. Thus it is a
matter of judgement and context whether we regard as
good or bad the effect of running a program: it might
delete useful data (as might a virus) and so be judged
bad, or it might perform useful garbage collection by
removing inaccessible data, and so be judged good.
In a previous article,32 we have made the case for
entropy structures as a means of evaluating an action
in cyberspace that combines judgements about desir-
able features of cyberspace with its discrete, and hence
unambiguously definable, nature. An entropy struc-
ture is an ordering on cyberspace defined to capture
the notion of a bad state change. The state-after is
worse than the state-before. The state S of cyberspace
consists of the values of all data, including software.
A bad action changes state S1 into S2, where S2
is greater in the entropy ordering; a benign action
decreases the entropy ordering. The effect of any
action is characterised, as a state transformer, mathe-
matically by the relationship (a predicate) between the
state-before, the input and output, and the state-after
(in the example above, state is partitioned into used
and unused store and the action converts some used
store into unused store). It is then a matter of proof
or counterexample whether an action is good (none of
its transitions yields an after-state which is greater in
the entropy ordering than its before-state) or evil (there
is a before-state and a transition in which the after-
state is greater in the entropy ordering). Furthermore,
the formalism can be used to determine when one
action is more, or less, evil than another. The increase
of entropy has been chosen, of course, to match the
standard view from thermodynamics. However, in that
setting no judgement is required since any increase,
leading as it does to an increase in global randomness,
is deemed bad.33 In summary, it is reasonable to permit
an Artificial Agent to be the patient of evil and thus
to have a moral standing. We conclude that the inter-
pretation of the relational and interactive structure,
symbolised by the triple <agent, action, patient>,
is one of the central component of any Information
Ethics.
(1998) and developed in L. Floridi and J. Sanders. Entropy
as Evil in Information Ethics. In L. Floridi, editor, Etica and
Politica, special issue on Computer Ethics, 2, 1999b http://
www.univ.trieste.it/˜dipfilo/etica_e_politica/1999_2/homepage.
html.
32 Floridi and Sanders (1999).
33 For formal definitions, examples and further discussion see
Floridi and Sanders (1999).
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The uniqueness debate
The informative ‘uniqueness’ debate34 has aimed to
determine whether the issues confronting CE are
unique and hence whether, as a result, CE should be
developed as an independent Macroethics. The debate
arises from two different interpretations of the policy
vacuum problem,35 one more conservative, the other
more radical.
The conservative interpretation suggests that, in
order to cope with the policy vacuum, standard Macro-
ethics, like Consequentialism or Deontologism, are
sufficient. They should be adapted, enriched and
extended, but they have the conceptual resources to
deal with CE questions successfully. Coherently, the
conservative approach maintains that:
Extending the idea that computer technology creates
new possibilities, in a seminal article, Moor [1985]
suggested that we think of the ethical questions
surrounding computer and information technology
as policy vacuums. Computer and information
technology creates innumerable opportunities. This
means that we are confronted with choices about
whether and how to pursue these opportunities, and
we find a vacuum of policies on how to make
these choices. [. . .] I propose that we think of the
ethical issues surrounding computer and informa-
tion technology as new species of traditional moral
issues. On this account the idea is that computer-
ethical issues can be classified into traditional
ethical categories. They always involve familiar
moral ideas such as personal privacy, harm, taking
responsibility for the consequences of one’s action,
putting people at risk, and so on. On the other hand,
the presence of computer technology often means
that the issues arise with a new twist, a new feature,
a new possibility. The new feature makes it difficult
to draw on traditional moral concepts and norms.
[. . .] The genus-species account emphasizes the idea
that the ethical issues surrounding computer tech-
nology are first and foremost ethical. This is the best
way to understand computer-ethical issues because
ethical issues are always about human beings.36
34 D.G. Johnson. Sorting Out the Uniqueness of Computer-
Ethical Issues. In L. Floridi, editor, Etica and Politica, special
issue on Computer Ethics, 2, 1999b http://www.univ.trieste.it/
˜dipfilo/etica_e_politica/1999_2/homepage.html; W. Maner. Is
Computer Ethics Unique? In L. Floridi, editor, Etica and Polit-
ica, special issue on Computer Ethics, 2, 1999b http://www.
univ.trieste.it/˜dipfilo/etica_e_politica/1999_2/homepage.html.
35 J.H. Moor. What is Computer Ethics? Metaphilosophy,
16(4): 266–275, 1985.
36 Johnson (1999).
According to the radical interpretation, the policy
vacuum problem indicates that CE deals with abso-
lutely unique issues, in need of a completely new
approach. It argues that
[Computer Ethics] must exist as a field worthy of
study in its own right and not because it can provide
a useful means to certain socially noble ends. To
exist and to endure as a separate field, there must
be a unique domain for computer ethics distinct
from the domain for moral education, distinct even
from the domains of other kinds of professional
and applied ethics. Like James Moor, I believe
computers are special technology and raise special
ethical issues, hence that computer ethics deserves
special status.37
The conservative approach is faced by at least three
problems. It does not clarify which Macroethics should
be adopted to deal with CE problems. It does not make
explicit whether CE problems could be used as test
experiments to evaluate specific Macroethics. And it
runs the risk of missing what is intrinsically new in CE,
not at the level of problems and concepts, but at the
level of contribution to the ethical discourse. A mere
extension of standard Macroethics would not enable
us to uncover the nature of AE, for example.
The radical approach is equally faced by at least
three problems. It seems unable to show the absolute
uniqueness of CE issues. None of the cases provided
by Maner is uncontroversially unique, for example.
This is to be expected: it would be surprising if
any significant moral issue were to belong to only
one limited conceptual region, without interacting
with the rest of the ethical context. Second, even if
unique ethical issues in CE were available, this would
not mean that their “uniqueness” would be simply
inherited by the discipline that studies them, as it
were. Unique problems may still require only some
evolutionary adaptation of old solutions, and unique
disciplines are not necessarily so because they are
involved with unique subjects, for they may share
their subjects with other disciplines, the difference
resting, for example, in their methodologies, aims and
approaches. Third, a radical approach runs the risk of
isolating CE from the more general ethical discourse.
This would mean missing the opportunity to enrich our
choice of Macroethical approaches.
By introducing the analysis of AE as a case-study,
the view presented in this paper suggests that there
may be a third approach to the policy vacuum. We
have tried to show that the analysis of AE has been
made possible by an approach that is not conservative,
but that does not consider CE unique in a radical sense
37 Maner (1999).
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either. Although it is more manifest in cyberspace and
readily studied there, AE is not necessarily unique to
CE. It may be apparent, for example, in Environmental
Ethics and in the world of physical automata. Yet,
because of its novelty and important position in ethics,
AE seems to demand further study in its own right.
Because it embraces many of the current difficulties
of CE, it should be studied in, amongst other places,
an applied setting where appropriate policy decisions
can be analysed. This approach to the nature of CE
interprets the policy vacuum problem as a signal that
the monopoly exercised by standard Macroethics is
unjustified, and that the family of ethical theories can
be enriched by including an object-oriented approach
that is not biologically biased. With their novelty, CE
problems like AE do not strictly force, but certainly
encourage us to modify the perspective from which we
look at the field of ethics. Yet the novelty of CE prob-
lems is not so dramatic as to require the development
of an utterly new, separate and unrelated discipline.
CE has its own methodological foundation, Informa-
tion Ethics38 and so it is able to support autonomous
theoretical analyses. And it contains domain-specific
issues, including pressing practical problems, which
can be used to ‘test’ its methodology. The conclu-
sion to be drawn from this case-study is that rather
than allowing standard Macroethics to “occupy” the
territory of CE or isolating CE in an impossibly
autonomous and independent position, CE should be
promoted to the level of another Macroethics.
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